# Functional Bootstrapping: the FHEW approach to Homomorphic Encryption

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
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## **Fully Homomorphic Encryption**

• Encryption: used to protect data at rest or in transit



 Fully Homomorphic Encryption: supports arbitrary computations (F) on encrypted data



#### **FHE Timeline**


- Bootstrapping: [G'09]
- FHE from (R)LWE
  - [BV'11],[B/FV'12],[BGV'12],[GHS'12],...
- FHE from (R)LWE with polynomial modulus
  - [GSW'13],[BV'14],[AP'14],...
- Functional bootstrapping
  - [DM'15] (FHEW), [CGGI'16],...,[LW'23],[DKM'24]
- Approximate FHE: [CKKS'17],...

#### This Talk

- High level
  - focus on conceptual ideas
  - very few technical details (read the papers!)
- Describe
  - current state of the art
  - how we got here
  - open problems / research directions

#### Lattice-based Encryption

- secret key:  $sk = s \in Z^n$
- $Enc_s(m) = (A, b = As+m\Delta+e) \mod q$ 
  - − A ← random matrix (mod q)
  - e  $\leftarrow$  random noise (|e| <  $\Delta/2$ )
- Dec<sub>s</sub>(A,b):
  - $c = b As = \Delta m + e$
  - output round(  $c / \Delta$ ) = m
  - Notation: [[ c ]] = round( c /  $\Delta$  )



#### Homomorphic Operations

- $C_0 = Enc_s(m_0) = (A_0, A_0s + m_0\Delta + e_0)$
- $C_1 = Enc_s(m_1) = (A_1, A_1s + m_1\Delta + e_1)$
- $C_0+C_1=((A_0+A_1),(A_0+A_1)S+(m_0+m_1)\Delta+(e_0+e_1))$
- Similarly for (tensor) product ... but trickier
- If  $|e_i| < \Delta/4$ , then
  - $|e_0 + e_1| < \Delta/2$
  - $C_0+C_1$  is a valid encryption of  $m_0+m_1 \pmod{p=q/\Delta}$
- ... but  $C_0+C_1+C_2$  may not decrypt correctly


## Bootstrapping [Gentry'09]

- Decryption removes noise from (A,b)=Enc(m)
  - $Dec(s,(A,b)) = [[b As]] = [[\Delta m + e]] = m$
  - But Dec requires knowing s!
- Bootstrapping: publish ek = Enc(s)
  - Compute Dec(...,(A,b)) homomorphically on ek = Enc(s)
  - Boot((A,b)) = Eval(Dec(...,(A,b)),ek)



## Noise growth and FHE

- M = max noise for C to decrypt correctly
- Compute homomorphically until Noise(C) = M
- Apply Boot(C) to reduce noise



## Roles of Eval in FHE

- Actual computation on encrypted data
  - application specific, directly exposed to the user
  - Outer Encryption: Enc(.)
- Evaluate Decryption function/bootstrapping
  - More of a bookkeeping task
  - Technically necessary, but unrelated to application
  - Inner encryption: Enc(.)

#### **Traditional approach**

- Used by [Gentry, BV, BGV, BFV, etc.]
- Basic operations: {+,\*}
  - Enough to describe arbitrary computations
  - Boolean circuits:  $\{xor, /\} = \{+, *\} \mod 2$
- Bootstrapping:
  - Express Dec as a arithmetic/boolean circuit
  - Evaluate using the same  $Enc \approx Enc$
  - Enc, Enc may use different parameters as an optimization

## Functional Bootstrapping approach

- Introduced in [DM'15] FHEW, and further developed in FHEW-like schemes like TFHE
- Boot[f]:  $Enc(m) \rightarrow Enc(f(m))$ 
  - Boot = Boot[id] :  $Enc(m) \rightarrow Enc(m)$
- Does Boot[f] already give FHE?
  - No: f is a unary function on fixed message space
  - need at least one binary operation to combine inputs
- Typically enough for Enc to support {+}

#### **Functional Bootstrapping**

- New computational model: { +, f }
- Boot[f]: Essentially the same cost as Boot[id]
- Outer scheme: enough for Enc to support {+}
  - Very simple Enc, Dec
  - Very fast Boot[f] = Eval(f(Dec(...))

#### Example: FHEW "NAND" circuits

- Encode bits  $\{0,1\}$  as subset of  $Z_3 = \{0,1,2\}$
- Addition:  $\{0,1\} \times \{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1,2\}$ 
  - regular addition, does not use reduction mod p
- Let **f** be the function
  - f(0)=1, f(1)=1, f(2)=0
- NAND(x,y) = f(x+y)

- x=y=1 iff x+y=2 iff f(x+y)=0

• [DM'15]: FHE bootstrapping in a fraction of a second

#### Other functions

- majority(x,y,z):
  - p=4, greaterThanOne(x+y+z)
- symmetric boolean function:
  - $f(x_1+...+x_k)$  using p=k
- arbitrary functions:
  - $f(x_1+2x_2+4x_3+8x_4+...)$  using p=2<sup>k</sup>
  - note: p exponential in k

## Putting FHEW into context


- [GSW'13] new homomorphic multiplication with "asymmetric" error growth
- [BV'14] bootstrapping
  - Express GSW.Dec as a branching program
  - Use GSW to evaluate branching program
- [AlperinSheriff,Peikert'14]
  - Idea: use different Enc for normal Eval and Boot
  - Implement Boot using a scheme optimized for Dec
  - Outer (Enc, Eval) still need to support {+,\*}

#### Homomorphic Decryption

- Constant value: (A,b) mod q
- Encrypted input: ek = Enc(s mod q)
- Computation:  $s \rightarrow [[b As]]$ 
  - $\mathbf{x} = (b-As)$  linear operation modulo q
  - [[ **x** ]] non-linear operation:  $Z_q \rightarrow Z_p$

## AP'14 bootstrapping (basic)

- Let Enc(b) be a "bit" encryption scheme supporting scalar products
- Encrypt (x mod q) as q ciphertexts
  - E[v] = [Enc(0), ..., Enc(0), Enc(1), Enc(0), ..., Enc(0)]
  - $E[(v+w) \mod q] = E[v] \star E[w]$  (convolution)
- Bootstrap using ek[c,i] = E[c\*si]
  - Initialize Acc := E[b]
  - Iterate:  $Acc[v] := Acc[v] \star ek[-A_i,i] = Acc[v A_is_i]$
- Rounding: map  $Acc[b-As] \rightarrow Enc([[b-As]])$ 
  - [Enc(?),Enc(?),Enc(?),Enc(?),Enc(?),Enc(?),Enc(?),Enc(?)]



Half(3)=1

## Polynomial Rings (simplified)

- Cyclic R[n] = Z[X] /  $(X^n 1) \approx Z^n$
- BGV/BFV: use R[n] to perform n operations in parallel
- Here: use elements of R[n] to encode  $Z_n$

$$- [0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 0] \rightarrow X^{\vee}$$

- [v+w mod n] = [v]★[w] →  $X^{v+w \mod n} = X^vX^w$
- Acc[v] = RLWE( $X^v$ ), ek[v] = RGSW[ $X^v$ ]
- extract:  $Acc[X^{v}] \rightarrow LWE(f(v))$
- For security use cyclotomic R instead of cyclic

## FHEW [Ducas,M.'15]

- Efficient (Ring-based) version of [AP'14]
  - Instead of q LWE ciphertexts [Enc(0),...,Enc(1),...,Enc(0)]
  - Use a single ring ciphertext RLWE(v)=(a,as+e+ $\Delta X^{\vee}$ )
  - $coeff(X^{v}) = (0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0)$
  - Ring dimension n = q
- Functional bootstrapping
  - Instead of rounding [[ x ]], use an arbitrary function f(x)
  - map Acc[b-as] = LWE(f(b-as))
- [DM'15] (Functional) bootstrapping in fraction of a second

#### Developments and State of the Art

- Different bootstrapping algorithms
  - [CKKS'16],[LMK+'23]
- Amortized bootstrapping
  - [MS'18,GPvL'23,DKMS'24]
- Expanding the message space
  - [BDF'18],[LW'23] (Note: F.H.Liu, H.Wang)
- Hybrid bootstrapping:
  - [LW'23] (different paper/people: Z.Liu, Y.Wang !)

## **Bootstrapping Algorithms/Keys**

- FHEW/DM: ring version of [AP'14]
  - ek[i,j]=E(2<sup>i</sup>s<sub>j</sub>) for {i<lg q, j<n}</pre>
  - Write  $a_j = \sum 2^i a_j$
- TFHE/CKKS: variant based on [GINX'16]
  - Write  $s_j = \sum 2^i s_{ij}$  with  $s_{ij} \in \{0,1\}$ ,  $\{i < lg q, j < n\}$
  - ek[i,j]=E(Sij)
  - Better than FHEW/DM when  $s_i \in \{0,1\}$  (see ePrint 2020/086)
- [LMK+23]: Best performance using automorphisms

## Amortized FHEW bootstrapping

- FHEW: uses R=Z<sup>n</sup> to encode Z<sub>n</sub> for n=q
  - Very inefficient encoding
  - Sequential bootstrapping: one ciphertext at a time
- [Micciancio,Sorrell'18]:
  - Alternative method to "parallelize" bootstrapping
  - Combine n LWE ciphertexts into a single RLWE
  - Decryption: b-a $\star$ s where a,b,s are in R=Z<sup>n</sup>
  - $s \in R=Z^n$  is still encrypted as  $E(s_i)$  for i=1...n

## Amortized bootstrapping: efficiency

- Homomorphic computation:
  - Still operates on scalar values b, a<sub>i</sub>, s<sub>i</sub> mod q, encrypted as ring elements RGSW(X<sup>c</sup>)
  - Improvement is from smaller operation count
- Cost of bootstrapping n ciphertexts
  - Sequential: n scalar products a\*s, for total n<sup>2</sup> ops
  - Amortized: 1 convolution  $a \star s$ , for total O(n log n) ops (potential)
  - [MS'18]: O(n<sup>1+ $\epsilon$ </sup>) ops, for constant  $\epsilon$
  - Amortized cost per input ciphertext:  $O(n) \rightarrow O(n^{\epsilon})$

## Amortized bootstrapping in practice

- [MS'18] asymptotic amortized cost  $O(n^{\epsilon}) = c n^{\epsilon}$ 
  - Only addition in the exponent:  $X^{v+w} = X^{v}X^{w}$
  - Large hidden constant  $c=exp(-\varepsilon)$
  - Far from practical due to Nussbaumer transform
- [GPvL'23],[DKMS'24] reduce c to 1/ε
  - Use automorphisms for twiddle factors: much closer practical
  - Require non-power-of-2 cyclotomic rings
  - Limited improvement over sequential bootstrapping

#### Expanding the message space

- [DM'15,CKKS'16, etc.]: E(v mod q) using R[q]
  - LWE ciphertext modulus  $q=\Delta p$
  - E[q] ring dimension  $q=\Delta p$  is linear in p
  - Exponential in  $|v| = \log p$
- Increasing p is very inefficient!
- [AP'14]: better encoding for large q

## Cycle products

- if  $q = p\Delta = p_1p_2...p_k$  use CRT:
  - Instead of  $R[q] = R[p_1p_2...p_k]$
  - Use  $R[p_1], R[p_2], ..., R[p_k]$
  - Final "interpolation" step of computation is still linear in q
- [Bonnoron,Ducas,Fillinger'18]: practical variant
  - Use just the product of two cycles  $q=p_1p_2$ ,
  - Increases FHEW message from 1-bit to 6-bit words

## [Liu,Wang'23 (a)]

- Input LWE: q can be as small as  $\sqrt{n}$
- Use ring product R[pq] = (R[q] ★ R[p])
  - p ≈  $\sqrt{n}$ , ring size  $\sqrt{n} \sqrt{n} = n$
  - each ring element packs  $p \approx \sqrt{n}$  values mod q
- Homomorphic product:
  - this is a tensor product, contains unwanted "cross terms"
- Solution: use  $R[pqr] = R[q] \star R[p] \star R[r]$  where  $p,r \approx n^{1/4}$ 
  - Use Homomorphic Trace computation to cancel "cross terms"
  - drawback: can make effective use of only n<sup>1/4</sup> slots

## [Liu,Wang'23 (b)]

- [LW'23a]: packs n<sup>1/4</sup> slots in 1 FHEW ciphertext
  - Amortized complexity of bootstrapping: n<sup>0.75</sup>
  - Better than FHEW (n), but worse than [MS'18]  $n^{\epsilon}$
- [LW'23b]: combines [LW'23a]+[MS'18]
  - amortized complexity: polylog(n)!
  - inherits Nussbaumer transform from [MS'18]
  - great in theory, but far from practical

#### **Practical considerations**

- [BDF'18],[LW'23ab],[MS'18/GPvL'23/DKM'24]
  - improve FHEW in interesting directions
  - mostly theoretical, poor performance in practice
  - require rings R[q] for q other than  $2^n$
- Arithmetic in non-powers-of-two rings
  - not well supported by libraries
  - seems 10x slower or worse in practice

## Hybrid approach

- [Liu,Wang'23] Use BFV to bootstrap FHEW
  - express FHEW bootstrap as a degree q polynomial
  - evaluate polynomial using BFV SIMD {+,\*}
    operations
- Performance
  - n parallel bootstrapping thanks to BFV SIMD
  - supports FHEW functional bootstrapping
  - 7ms per bootstrapping!

#### Conclusion

- Functional bootstrapping
  - powerful model of homomorphic encryption
  - Many interesting theoretical developments
  - Best performance: hybrid with BGV/BFV (superpoly)
  - Explored also in pure BGV/BFV/CKKS setting (superpoly)
- Research directions
  - improve practicality of FHEW-like functional boostrapping with poly(n) modulus
  - needed: practical support of arbitrary cyclotomic rings